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Abstract This paper analyses the evolution of fiscal policy in central and eastern
European countries during the EU accession process, testing for country and time
specific effects. This is done by constructing Taylor-type policy rules and by
calculating three measures of fiscal stance. A key finding is that the differences
across countries are more significant than those across time. Baltic countries tended
to have had tighter fiscal policy which responded to the output gap, larger central
European countries had more lax (and increasingly lax) fiscal policies which were
unresponsive to the output gap. These differences correlate closely with cross-
country differences in exchange rate regimes and no link is found to either spending
composition or political variables. Taken together the results suggest that the
exchange rate regime is by far the most significant determinant of fiscal
performance. These results suggest that the “soft power” of the prospect of EU
entry did not act as a spur to greater fiscal discipline and that higher budget deficits
in recent years cannot be blamed on costs of accession.
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1 Introduction
Better policymaking and institutional reforms are often cited as key benefits of closer
European integration. The experience of the EU expansions to the South and to the
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East provides compelling evidence for the accession process as an impetus for rapid
and far reaching institutional reform in states seeking EU membership. On the
economic front, as Berger et al. (2007) note, one of the strongest arguments for an
early enlargement of the EU to Central and Eastern Europe was that the accession
process would provide an external anchor for macroeconomic policies.
In addition, the run-up of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was also
associated with major changes to policymaking. In the 1990s, following the signing
of the Maastricht Treaty, the goal of EMU membership provoked strenuous efforts to
meet the strict criteria governing entry. Meeting the inflation and exchange rate
criteria required a substantial reduction in inflation rates in many countries, and on
the fiscal side the need to comply with the debt and deficit criteria of the Maastricht
Treaty led to a concerted and historically exceptional period of fiscal retrenchments
across many countries.1
This paper analyses whether the recently completed accession process fostered a
similar improvement in fiscal policymaking alongside the political and institutional
reforms already mentioned. This “accession period” is defined to be from 1996 to
2004. By 1996, all aspiring members the bulk of reforms concerning privatisation,
property rights, banking and other market institutions had been made and all eight
countries had lodged applications to become accession candidates. This process
concluded on May 1 2004 with the full accession of 8 New Member States2 (NMS)
from central and Eastern Europe.
There are no fiscal, monetary or exchange rate criteria for joining the EU. The
only economic criteria are a functioning market economy plus commitment to the
single market for labour, goods and capital. However, all the NMS are committed to
joining the Euro as part of the accquis communitaire. This means that unlike the
original Maastricht signatories, the accession phase and the run-up to EMU
membership may not be two distinct and very separate epochs. For the NMS these
two epochs will overlap to a greater or lesser extent, depending on the speed with
which policymakers target membership of the single currency. Thus one might
expect so see some of the economic policy gains associated with the run-up to EMU
occurring prior to May 1st 2004.
Previous theoretical and empirical work suggests various factors which may have
influenced fiscal policy in NMS between 1996 and 2004. Empirical work on the first
wave of EMU entrants (von Hagen et al. 2004; Hughes Hallett and Lewis 2007)
suggest there was a marked improvement in fiscal discipline in the run up to EMU,
followed by a loosening after EMU entry was assured. Smaller countries tended to
make greater efforts to consolidate than larger countries, which is generally
attributed to the fact that smaller countries have less political power. This means
that they are easier to exclude from the initial union, and, after joining, are easier to
1 For example, von Hagen et al. (2004) provide strong evidence of a “Maastricht Effect” in prompting
fiscal consolidations, Turrini and In ‘t Veld (2004) show fiscal policy became more counter cyclical after
1993.
2 The eight countries were: The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia
and Slovenia. Malta and Cyprus also joined on this date but are not considered here as the focus is on
Central and Eastern European countries.
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take sanctions against, which makes threatened punishments for fiscal laxity more
credible.
This was similar to the argument advanced by Berger et al. (2007) who find a
significant loosening in the larger central European economies fiscal policy post-
1999, once they believed their membership was assured. These authors’ preferred
explanation is that the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were of greater
geopolitical importance, and that having joined NATO, they believed they could not
be excluded by the EU; whereas the Baltic states had to maintain discipline, because
their lesser geopolitical importance made the threat to exclude them credible.
A well developed strand of literature on exchange rate regimes (see for example,
Canzoneri et al. 1998) suggests that currency boards or hard pegs are only successful
if fiscal policy is sustainable and thus governments are “forced” to run sound fiscal
policies.3 The argument is that if a currency board works successfully, then the hands
of the monetary authorities are tied, and therefore, in the language of Sargent and
Wallace (1981), there is “monetary dominance.” Fiscal authorities do not believe
they will be bailed out by looser monetary policies, and are hence constrained from
running up unsustainable deficit and debt paths.
These considerations suggest a natural split between the Baltic states (Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania) and the large central European countries—Large Hapsburgs—
(Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland). The Baltic states have are characterised by
fixed exchange rate policies, although the institutional arrangements and the
currency to which they are fixed has varied across time and between countries.4
The Hapsburgs have followed a variety of looser exchange rate regimes. In addition,
within-group trading patterns, linkages to the Former Soviet Union as well as
country size, suggest a natural division between the Baltics and Large Hapsburgs.
Such a distinction is also drawn elsewhere in the literature, see for example Hughes
Hallett and Lewis (2007), (Kopits and Székely 2003). A third group of Small
Hapsburgs (Slovakia and Slovenia) is also identified—who, like the Baltics are of
small size, but who are more similar to the bigger Hapsburgs in economic terms.
Accordingly, this geographic classification is used alongside time specific variables
as a potential determinant of fiscal policymakers behaviour.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 considers fiscal policy in terms of a
Taylor-type rule, where fiscal policy responds to the output gap, adding in additional
variables to capture regime effects. Section 3 examines the problem of sustainability
and debt dynamics more explicitly, deriving measures of fiscal stance directly from
the theory of sustainable fiscal policy. In Section 4 the composition of government
spending is examined as a possible explanation for the differences across countries
and over time. Section 5 concludes.
3 However, whether the threat of exchange rate regime collapse is sufficient to discipline fiscal policy is a
separate issue. Recent empirical work (e.g. Tornell and Velasco 1995 and Sun 2003) has suggested that
tight exchange rate regimes are not, in and of themselves sufficient to discipline fiscal policy.
4 The Estonian Kroon has operated under a currency board since its inception in 1992—first backed by the
German Mark, and latterly the Euro. Lithuania operated a currency board backed by the US dollar until
January 2002, and subsequently the Euro. The Latvian Lats was pegged first to the IMFs Special Drawing
Right, and, from 2005 to the Euro.
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2 Fiscal policy rules
In this section fiscal policy is described by means of a simple rule, analogous to the
Taylor Rule in the monetary policy literature, where the observed budget deficit is
given as a function of the output gap.5 This gives a measure of the pro- or counter-
cyclicality of fiscal policy, and the extent to which fiscal policy is geared towards
stabilising output.
Kattai and Lewis (2004) estimate such country-specific equations, but with a
maximum of eight observations per country, only two parameters—an intercept and
output gap co-efficient—may be estimated. To test for the impact of other variables
such as country size, time effects, political factors etc requires the pooling of data
across countries to conserve degrees of freedom. Pooling the data into a single
sample (but allowing for fixed or random effects) is a widely used methodology in
studies aiming to quantify such other influences on fiscal policy (See for example
Turrini and In ’t Veld 2004; Berger et al. 2007).
The data are taken from Eurostat, supplemented where required by data from the
IMF’s International Financial Statistics Database. Full details of the dataset used are
given in the Appendix. The principal reasons for this choice were first, that it was
these figures (rather than those of the IMF or another agency) that would be the
figures utilised by European Union agencies monitoring the economic development
of CEECs and second, that using a different dataset to Berger et al. (2007) provides
the opportunity to see if their results are robust to a different data source.6
2.1 Econometric methodology
In this section Taylor-type fiscal rules are estimated. The standard form of such rules
is:
dit ¼ a þ bbyit þ gzit ð1Þ
Where d is the deficit ratio, by is the output gap, and z is a vector capturing
country-group and time specific effects. The methodology utilised is instrumental
variables regression, where the money supply, inventories and gross fixed capital
formation and its own lag are used to instrument the output gap.7 To capture time
effects, a pre-1999 time trend (equal to 0 from 2000 onwards) is included as are a
post-1999 dummy and a post-1999 time trend. This corresponds to the date at which
the Large Hapsburgs joined NATO, considered by Berger et al. (2007) to be the
point at which these countries felt EU accession was assured.8 Diagnostic tests also
support the choice of 1999 as a “focal year” for time effects.
5 See Balabriga and Martinez Mongay (2002) for a detailed justification of the use of fiscal “Taylor Rules”
to describe the behaviour of fiscal policymakers.
6 In the context of formerly centrally planned economies, there are many methodological issues
concerning the compilation of data on government finances which mean that the different statistical
sources may yield significantly different raw data.
7 The data for all the variables used as instruments are taken from the IMF’s IFS database.
8 (Kopits and Székely 2003) also highlight this year as a potential structural break.
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To account for country differences the sample is split up into the three groups
described above, and experimented and both fixed and random effects were
experimented with to capture country specific effects.9 As an experiment economic
variables expressed as ratios to potential as well as actual GDP were also used, but
no differences were found between the two sets of results. The regression results
(using economic variables as a percentage of actual GDP) are shown in Table 1.
The results suggest a marked difference between the three groups. The output gap
is only significant for the Baltic states, suggesting that in the large and small
Hapsburgs fiscal policy is not used for stabilisation purposes. This could reflect the
fact the Baltics have surrendered monetary policy to maintaining a fixed exchange
rate, and so fiscal policy is the only instrument left for stabilisation, whereas
countries with more flexible exchange rates are using monetary policy to stabilise
and thus use fiscal policy for other objectives.
The time dummies also reveal a post-1999 fiscal expansion of around 1% per year
in the Large Hapsburgs, and a smaller contraction in the Small Hapsburgs. This is
consistent with the view that smaller countries made efforts to consolidate fiscal
policy prior to EU entry, whereas larger countries felt the pressure had eased once
their accession was perceived to be secure. However, there is some evidence of an
expansion in the Baltic states post 1999, although only for the fixed effects
regression, and with a lower significance level. This could well be explained by the
observation that following the budget deficit rise in response to the 1999 Russian
crisis, Lithuania and Latvia did not fully recover their budgetary position in the
upswing (See the graphs of fiscal policy stance or the figures in Kattai and Lewis
(2004) for a demonstration of this point).
There is no significant role for interest rates in the Baltics or Smaller Habsburgs,
suggesting that the falling interest rate burden in the latter was simply used to
expand the primary position. The co-efficient sign in the Large Hapsburgs random
effects regression is implausibly high, suggesting that it could reflect the
unsuitability of treating Slovenia and Slovakia as a homogenous group. This may
also explain why the constant term is not significantly different from zero in this
group.10
Lastly, the constant term is only significant for the Large Hapsburgs—equal to
some 3.6% per year, meaning that the bulk of the difference in fiscal performance
between the Baltics and Large Hapsburgs was constant across the sample period.
The post 1999 loosening only explains a small fraction of the difference between the
groups, suggesting that some other factor must have been at work.
In addition to the variables shown in Table 1, a wide variety of other variables
which may affect fiscal policymaking were also experimented with, such as the
electoral cycle, population, decentralisation of government etc. However, none of
these country specific factors turned out to be significant. As a robustness check the
9 There is no consensus between similar studies on whether to use fixed or random effects. To preserve
generality, enhance comparability, and to demonstrate that the results are robust to estimation method
chosen, both results are reported.
10 The t-statistic turns out not to be significant, due to high variance of the co-efficient estimate rather than
an estimated co-efficient close to zero.









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































regressions were repeated with the output gap replaced by economic growth11 on the
right hand side. The results produced were similar—the only difference being that
the expansion in the Baltic states showed up in the step dummy, rather than in the
post-1999 trend.
3 Fiscal stance and fiscal sustainability
The previous section analysed fiscal policy in terms of a simple reaction function. In
this section, a different question is considered, namely the sustainability of deficit
and debt ratios over time. As several authors have pointed out,12 the faster growth
and nominal appreciation experienced by CEECs means that they can run larger
deficits than Western European nations, without fiscal policy becoming unsustain-
able—indeed a structural budget deficit may, under certain circumstances, be
compatible with a stable or even falling debt ratio. In addition, the burden of interest
payments on outstanding debt could be an important determinant of fiscal policy. A
falling interest rate burden creates a dividend which can be used either to run
primary surpluses (and hence reduce the debt ratio) or to permit a looser primary
balance.
Accordingly, in this section the focus is shifted from budget deficits, to measures
of fiscal stance which are explicitly derived from the economic theory of sustainable
fiscal policy. Specifically, the sustainability of fiscal policy derived theoretically
from the relationship between interest payments on the existing debt stock, economic
growth, inflation, alongside the primary and total budget balance.
To do this, three measures of fiscal stance are constructed. In each case, the
measure of fiscal stance is obtained by taking the difference between actual fiscal
policy and the policy implied by three hypothetical benchmarks:
(a) The primary surplus is just sufficient to cover interest payments (i.e. the total
deficit is zero)
(b) The primary surplus is sufficient to cover interest payments over the course of
the cycle (but not necessarily in each year)
(c) The primary surplus ensures that the debt ratio remains stable.
For a full derivation of the benchmarks, see the Appendix. For now it can be
noted that the third measure is a more “liberal” measure than the others, because it
implies a constant debt ratio, as opposed to a steadily declining debt ratio.13 In
addition, the measures may give quite differing pictures of fiscal position—for
example, if a government is relying on fast growth and inflation to pay down its
debt, then they will perform well on indicator (c), but poorly on indicators (a) and
(b). Thus considering all three measures gives a better picture of how fiscal policy is
evolving.
11 This was the approach used by Berger et al. (2007).
12 See for example, Buiter and Grafe (2004), Hughes Hallett and Lewis (2007).
13 If the real debt stock is held constant, then under positive economic growth the debt:GDP ratio will
decline over time.
Fiscal policy in central and Eastern Europe: what happened in the run-up to EU accession? 21
At this juncture it is necessary to have data for debt ratios and interest payments,
as well as taxes and revenues. In the case of Slovakia and Slovenia, observations of
all these variables are not available throughout the period, and so these countries are
dropped from the analysis. For the other six countries, the dataset is broadly
adequate.14
These indicators can be used in two ways. First, they can be plotted for each
country over time for visual inspection. This can be a useful tool in small datasets—
since econometric tests have low power, the trained eye may pick up what formal
analysis cannot. Second, these fiscal policy indicators are used as variables in
econometric analysis.
3.1 Fiscal policy by country
In what follows, the fiscal policy measures for each country are graphed, grouping
the nations into Baltics and Large Hapsburgs as before. Figure 1 shows the Baltics,
Fig. 2 the Large Hapsburgs. Where debt or interest rate data is added from IMF
dataset, this is indicated by a break in the line.
The y-axis measures fiscal stance as a percentage of GDP. A positive number
corresponds to an expansionary stance, a negative number represents a contraction-
ary stance. All three measures derived above are graphed, t−g=z is the stance
relative to the benchmark where the primary surplus covers interest payments in
each and every year, t−g=zl/t where the benchmark is that the primary surplus
covers interest payments over the cycle, and b stab’y where the benchmark is a
stable debt ratio over time.
The three graphs reveal a relatively consistent picture across all three countries. The
congruence of the three indicators reflects the low debt ratios of these countries—
hence inflation and growth effects on existing debt stocks are small. Prior to 1999
fiscal policy is broadly consistent with stable debt ratios. In 1999, the Russian crisis
causes a sharp fall in output, and a corresponding rise in deficits. In subsequent years,
fiscal stance reverts to its pre-shock state, although Latvia and Lithuania show some
sluggishness in recovering their budgetary positions during the upswing.
In comparison with the Baltics, fiscal policy is significantly looser in all three
countries. In the early part of the accession period, inflation helped to keep debt
ratios down in Poland and Hungary, but as inflation slowed debt dynamics
worsened. However, this fall in inflation cannot account for the fiscal slippage
post-1999, because all three fiscal policy indicators rise in this period, indicating that
it was deteriorations in the primary balances that were to blame rather than slow
growth or lower inflation.
14 The IMF’s IFS database was used to replace the missing observations for debt and interest rate figures.
As a consequent the debt stability benchmark (but not the others) is calculated using data drawn from two
different accounting methodologies. However, a comparison between the datasets for years where both
record observations suggests that the methodologies produced very similar figures. A further check was
made comparing the different fiscal policy measures for consistency. These suggested that the additional
degrees of freedom gained by supplementing the data with IMF figures outweighed any possible problems
induced by mixing the data. Using IMF data for taxes, revenues and deficits however does affect the other
two fiscal policy indicators. Since policymakers in NMS use EU figures, it seemed reasonable to use EU
data wherever possible for this analysis.
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3.2 Fiscal policy by country group: a cross-sectional analysis
Next, fiscal policy stance is analysed using each of the derived fiscal policy
measures as a dependent variable. As in the last section, the data are pooled
according to the country groups, the only difference being that the Small Hapsburgs
are excluded due to data problems. To do this, regressions are estimated of the form:
fpijt ¼ a þ gzit
where fp corresponds to the fiscal policy measure for country i at time t, and z
corresponds to a vector of possible explanatory variables. Time specific variables are
included as before, and also include interest payments, following Berger et al. (2007),
to see if the burden of debt repayments has an effect on fiscal policy. As with the earlier
estimations, political variables were originally included, but found to be insignificant.
The results are shown in Table 2.
For the Baltic states, there is some evidence of a fiscal expansion in 1999—but
this is probably due to the budgetary consequences of the Russian Crisis. Moreover,

















































Fig. 1 Fiscal stance in Baltic countries
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large Hapsburgs, a quite different picture emerges. For these nations, fiscal policy
gets looser after 1999, by around 0.9 percentage points of GDP per year.
Cumulatively, this implies that fiscal policy was around 4.5% of GDP looser on
the date of accession than it was in 1999.
These results reveal a clear difference between the country groups. The constant
term shows that other things being equal, the Baltic nations had a more restrictive
fiscal policy stance (as shown by the constant term) than the Large Hapsburgs.
Moreover, comparing the post-1999 coefficients, it can be seen that fiscal policy
tended to tighten in the Baltics, whereas it loosened in the Large Hapsburgs (Table 3).
4 De-composition of deficits by spending type
In this section the focus is on the expenditure side, because several contributions—













































Fig. 2 Fiscal stance in the Large Hapsburgs
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revenue side) and deficits. First, it has been noted by Buiter and Grafe (2004) and
others, that given the higher economic growth and higher inflation implied by the
catch-up process, allied with the low levels of public capital in many new EU
members, there is a rationale for running budget deficits, if those deficits are used to
finance public sector investment. In other words, as argued by Blanchard and
Giovazzi (2004), investment should be treated differently to other categories of
government spending in assessing fiscal discipline. A disaggregated analysis shows
whether higher deficits reflect higher levels of investment, or simply higher levels
of other items of spending. Second, the recent literature on public finances
suggests that the composition of public spending affects fiscal stance (Table 4). For
example von Hagen et al. (2002), find that the success of fiscal consolidations is
related to whether expenditure or revenues are targeted, and by what sort of
expenditure is cut.
Table 2 Fiscal policy stance
Independent variable Dependent variable (Fiscal policy 1: primary surplus covers interest payments)
Baltics Large Hapsburgs
Fixed Random Fixed Random
Constant 0.013 (0.998) −4.774 (0.040) −2.261 (0.490) 2.643 (0.164)
Interest Payments −1.259 (0.608) 1.410 (0.032) 1.144 (0.172) −0.276 (0.292)
Pre99 0.672 (0.608) 1.561 (0.068) 0.779 (0.262) 0.495 (0.529)
D99 5.250 (0.127) 7.385 (0.001) 2.208 (0.233) 0.724 (0.704)
Post99 −0.862 (0.008) −0.800 (0.004) 0.890 (0.007) 0.997 (0.002)
Within 0.5751 0.5360 0.6073 0.5069
R2 Between 0.8098 0.9092 0.1867 0.9934
Overall 0.2473 0.6013 0.1545 0.5544
Number of observations 21 21 19 19
Table 3 Fiscal policy stance
Independent variable Dependent variable (Fiscal policy 3: relative to debt stability)
Baltics Large Hapsburgs
Fixed Random Fixed Random
Constant −4.068 (0.491) −6.746 (0.006) 0.618 (0.856) −0.187 (0.907)
Interest Payments −0.666 (0.807) 0.799 (0.250) −2.547 (0.009) −2.366 (0.000)
Pre99 1.330 (0.366) 1.837 (0.042) 1.981 (0.014) 2.017 (0.002)
D99 8.078 (0.007) 9.302 (0.000) 4.999 (0.019) 5.209 (0.001)
Post99 −0.990 (0.00) −0.955 (0.001) 1.2667 (0.001) 1.322 (0.000)
Within 0.6524 0.6447 0.8951 0.8939
R2 Between 0.0003 0.9644 0.9490 0.9758
Overall 0.5760 0.6674 0.9284 0.9332
Number of observations 21 21 19 19
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4.1 Linear regression analysis
To analyse the relationship between the deficit ratio and the type of spending, two
regression equations are estimated:








Where Ei and sj correspond to the proportion of GDP spent on, and the share of
total government spending devoted to, expenditure type j. The six types of
government spending used are transfers in kind, cash transfers, government wages
and salaries, gross fixed capital formation, collective consumption and subsidies.
Shares of government spending are utilised so as to come up with a measure
which is independent of the size of the government sector. One may argue that the
size of the government sector is determined by other factors, not least social
preferences, and therefore, what matters is the proportion of collective expenditure
given to various uses. On the other hand, the regression using shares of GDP has the
advantage that it directly captures the effects of varying the level of each component.
For instance, one may argue that the relative shares of different components in total
government expenditure are largely independent—in the sense that the choice of
how much public investment is independent of the level of say subsidies. In
addition, total government spending data is not available for all countries over the
sample period, so expressing variables as a ratio to GDP allows the inclusion of
more observations.
These equations can then be used to test various hypotheses about budget deficits.
If higher budget deficits simply reflect (say) greater capital investment, then one
would observe a negative coefficient on capital investment. On the other hand, if one
Table 4 Different types of spending versus budget deficits
Independent variable Shares of government spending Shares of GDP
Full sample Comparison
Constant −8.041 (0.250) −4.281 (0.628) 14.502 (0.083)
Transfers in kind 0.362 (0.136) 0.521 (0.243) 0.177 (0.763)
Cash transfers 0.125 (0.375) −0.136 (0.669) −0.240 (0.457)
Government wages and salaries −0.413 (0.170) −0.461 (0.378) −0.970 (0.128)
Gross fixed capital formation 0.362 (0.116) −0.462 (0.378) 0.162 (0.776)
Collective consumption 0.236 (0.169) −0.406 (0.319) −0.090 (0.814)
Subsidies −1.526 (0.030) −2.670 (0.000) −3.416 (0.014)
Within 0.3054 0.1328 0.4712
R2 Between 0.9909 0.8503 0.8845
Overall 0.4883 0.5562 0.5805
n 24 35 24
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observes no significant coefficients, then it means there is no linkage between the
composition of budget deficits and their size, in which case, it can be concluded that
differences in budget deficits are the result of different intertemporal preferences,
political structures or some other unobserved variable.
The regression using shares of government spending has 24 observations
spanning four countries—Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, therefore,
it should be borne in mind that the results are derived from using only half of the
countries in the sample.
The regression using shares of GDP is estimated for two different samples, one
using the most possible observations, and one using the same observations as the
shares of total government spending regression. This enables a direct comparison
between the results to be made, by estimating two equations over the sample set of
observations. Results are presented in Table 4.
These results indicate that the only significant compositional effect comes from the
subsidy components which enter with a strongly negative sign. This implies that
higher spending on subsidies is associated with higher deficits—specifically that a 1%
rise in the share of subsidies in government spending is associated with a worsening
fiscal position of around 1.5% of GDP. One possible explanation of this is that both
are symptoms of a common problem—if political and institutional structures are such
that governments are unable to resist political pressure for subsidies, they are also
unable to resist political pressure for greater spending and/lower taxes and hence find
it harder to consolidate public finances. On the other hand, there is no evidence that
higher deficits are associated with higher investment, transfer payments, transfers in
kind, collective consumption or government employees.
Various other specifications were estimated—breaking the data down into the
same country specific groups as in Section 3, and using primary as well as total
balances. In each case, no different or significant results were found.
5 Conclusions
Section 2 examined fiscal policy on a country by country basis. This analysis
revealed a marked contrast between different countries. A key finding is that fiscal
policy was generally more expansionary in the Czech Republic, Poland and
Hungary. In addition, for the latter two, debt ratios were moderated initially by
higher inflation, and once inflation slowed, debt ratios began to rise more sharply.
The Baltic nations tended to follow less expansionary fiscal policies, apart from
during 1999 when there was a strong expansionary response to the Russian crisis.
However, after 1999, fiscal policy returns to more or less the same position as prior
to the crisis.
Section 3 tested for time and regional specific effects. The finding was that
there was a worsening of fiscal discipline post-1999 in the larger central European
countries, which was not matched in the Baltic states, or in Slovakia and Slovenia.
This finding is consistent across a variety of measures and provides further
empirical support for the hypothesis of Berger et al. (2007) that fiscal discipline
became looser once EU membership was secured. However, these results could
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simply be the result of the budgetary costs of the accquis communitaire. That said,
this explanation of deficits is troubling because it would appear that from a
disaggregated analysis these higher deficits cannot be explained by higher public
investment, and these effects do not show up for other member states, even those
with lower levels of GDP. The Baltic states tended to run tighter fiscal policies,
perhaps as a consequence of the greater need for discipline under a currency board.
The analysis of Section 2 suggested that inflation was being used to reduce debt
ratios in many larger central European economies, an option that is largely ruled out
under a currency board.
In Section 4, it was found that there is a relatively weak correlation between
the type of government spending, and deficits. On the one hand, this means that
higher deficits cannot simply be attributed to greater investment, but equally it
suggests that fiscal discipline is not strongly associated with targeting any one
particular component. It was found that subsidies was correlated with deficits,
suggesting that higher spending on subsidies was associated with looser fiscal
policies. In addition there was little evidence of cyclical influences on each
category.
Overall, the evidence suggests that accession process did not exert widespread
fiscal discipline on applicant countries during the accession process. There was a
loosening of fiscal policy in the large central European countries post-1999 which
could be interpreted as a relaxation of stance after the discipline provided by the
implicit threat of exclusion from the EU was lifted. However, the results indicate that
the loosening began well before 1999, suggesting that the subsequent loosening was
the continuation of the previous trend, rather than a new innovation.
Far more striking than the temporal effects are the differences between countries.
Testing for the effect of various political variables or the composition of spending
yielded no significant explanatory results. Rather, fiscal discipline appears to be
much more closely correlated with cross-country effects, and in particular the
currency board/tight peg arrangements of the Baltic nations. It could be argued that
what is being picked up here is a “small country” effect, rather than an exchange rate
regime effect.15 This is difficult to test for directly since there are no observation of a
large country with a currency board, or of a Baltic country with a floating exchange
rate. However, it should be noted that with the possible exception of Poland, none of
the central European countries are particularly large by GDP or population size.
In addition it is difficult to blame larger deficits on the costs of the accession process,
since there was no uniform loosening of fiscal policy across all countries. If anything,
one might expect the Baltic nations to have had higher costs, since they were starting
from lower levels of GDP and with fewer market institutions in the early 1990s.
It could be argued that the real spur to fiscal discipline is provided by EMU rather
than EU membership, since it is only the former which imposes binding numerical
entrance criteria for fiscal variables. The effects of this would be almost
15 For example, von Hagen et al. (2004) find greater discipline in smaller EU15 countries.
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observationally equivalent in this sample, because two of the three nations targeting
a swift entry to the Eurozone are the Baltic states of Lithuania and Estonia. However,
it is difficult to believe that a desire for early EMU entry can explain the observed
differences in fiscal discipline over the sample period for the simple reason that for
much of this time, EU entry, let alone EMU entry was not assured for either Estonia
or Lithuania. A more plausible explanation is that Estonia and Lithuania were
candidates for early entry on account of their currency boards which meant that—(a)
pushing for early Euro entry carried no opportunity cost in terms of lost monetary
policy autonomy and (b) public finances were already in a reasonably good shape.
In sum, the accession process did not produce any uniform effects on fiscal policy
over the eight countries considered here. The “soft power” of the prospect of EU
membership did not discipline fiscal policies. As with previous expansions of the
EU, it is the specific numerical criteria required for EMU entry, rather than EU
membership itself which appear to foster fiscal discipline.
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Appendix
A.1 Dataset
The primary data source is Eurostat. Where necessary this is supplemented by data
from national statistical agencies. The dataset contains variables for all EU member
states, acceding and candidate countries as well as Japan, Norway and the US. They are
comparable across countries and utilize the ESA95 methodology. The data is used by
the European Commission in the preparation of its reports, including European
Economy and its assessments of each member states convergence programme.
Eurostat data was used wherever possible, and supplemented with IMF data where
no comparable figures existed. The additions from IMF data are the following:
– Total Deficits/Interest Payments: HU 1996–2001, SI 1996–1998
– Debt:GDP Ratio: CZ, EE, LV, LT, HU, PL, SK 1996, SI 1996–1997
– Taxes & Govt Spending: EE, HU, SK, SI 1996–2000
A.2 Derivation of fiscal benchmarks
This paper uses the same analytical framework for the dynamics of debt in relation
to economic growth following Hughes Hallett (2002). The starting point is the
government’s budget constraint at time t, expressed in real terms:
Gt þ 1þ itð ÞBt1  Tt þ Bt ð4Þ
Suppose the government debt takes the form of one period bonds. B. In any given
period, government spending G plus the costs of servicing the stock of debt, B,
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accumulated in previous periods must be less than or equal to the sum of tax
revenue, T, plus the current period’s debt.
Dividing both sides by output gives:
gt þ 1þ itð Þ1þ xtð Þ bt1  tt þ bt ð5Þ
where lower case letters denote ratios of variable to GDP, and x is the growth rate of
nominal GDP, and where Yt ¼ 1þ xtð ÞYt1. This then yields the following equation
for the dynamics of the debt burden16:
b
 ¼ g  tð Þ þ i xð Þb ð6Þ
x can be decomposed into the sum of real GDP growth, +γ, and the rate of inflation, π.
Similarly, the nominal interest rate can be decomposed into the sum of the real
interest rate, r, and the rate of inflation. Making those substitutions, Eq. 3 can be re-
written in real terms.
b
 ¼ g  tð Þ þ r  gð Þb ð7Þ
Inserting b
 ¼ 0 into Eq. 4 and re-arranging, gives the condition for debt ratio
stability:
t  gð Þ ¼ r  gð Þb ð8Þ
From this analysis three “benchmark” fiscal policies can be generated and by
comparing actual fiscal policy with these benchmarks, three measures of fiscal
stance. The first benchmark is where the government runs a primary surplus
sufficient to cover all interest payments:
t  gð Þ ¼ ib ð9Þ
This can be modified in order to take into account fluctuations in the rate of
output. Assume that the government increases real expenditures in line with long-run
economic growth each year, setting a (time invariant) average tax rate consistent
with running a primary surplus equal to interest payments over the cycle. This
yields:
t  gð Þ ¼ g0  G0 1þ gð Þt þ ib ð10Þ
where +γ is the long rate rate of growth obtained by calculating the average com-
pound growth rate over the sample.
The last benchmark is that of debt stability, this is given by Eq. 5
16 From here on, time subscripts are suppressed for simplicity.
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